Il ruolo della corruzione nella relazione tra struttura proprietaria e performance aziendale. Un’analisi nell’Europa continentale

Purpose: The aim of the paper is to analyse the interaction effect corruption play in the relation between ownership structure and firm performance at firm level. The purpose is to assess which role corruption plays in determining the sign and form of ownership concentration and performance relationship, contributing in this way to the existing literature on this topic. Methodology: This paper analyses whether and how the Corruption Perception Index affects the relationship between corporate performance and ownership structure in 1,250 firms operating in four Continental European countries (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) over a seven-year period, 2010–2016 (4,776 firm year observations). We used hierarchical linear regression modelling to compensate for clustering at each level (industries, countries) and attendant violations of the OLS assumption of independent and identical distribution. Findings: Our findings show that corruption plays an important role as moderating variable that can influence the form and the magnitude of the ownership structure-performance relationship. Businesses operating in contexts characterized by high level of corruption presents high levels of ownership concentration and often are less sensitive to legislator pressure that pushes toward transparency and accountability for incentive foreign investors. This evidences how internal mechanisms of governance contribute to mitigate and substitute corruption effects, allowing them to achieve positive performance. This result suggests that institutional context variables should be taken into consideration from corporate governance scholars in their empirical investigations. Contribution: Research on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance conducted over the last decades shows no convergent evidence concerning the sign and form of the above-mentioned relationship. The contribution of the paper is twofold: first, our results evidence the relevant role played by the interaction effects between firm-level and country-level variables; second, it suggests important managerial and policy implications related to the interaction between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.