In this work, the problem of one-way flow social network formation is studied allowing for a general type of agents’ heterogeneity: Agents do not have an a priori opinion on the relative importance of the benefits they conjecture to get from connections with the others. Two different models of network formation are introduced, corresponding to different kinds of disutilities of establishing direct connections. These models are games with vector-valued payoffs, and “stable” network structures are here characterized by considering the concept of Pareto–Nash equilibrium and its refinements.
On the Effects of Heterogeneity in One Sided Network Formation
DE MARCO, Giuseppe
2010-01-01
Abstract
In this work, the problem of one-way flow social network formation is studied allowing for a general type of agents’ heterogeneity: Agents do not have an a priori opinion on the relative importance of the benefits they conjecture to get from connections with the others. Two different models of network formation are introduced, corresponding to different kinds of disutilities of establishing direct connections. These models are games with vector-valued payoffs, and “stable” network structures are here characterized by considering the concept of Pareto–Nash equilibrium and its refinements.File in questo prodotto:
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