Purpose – This study aims to investigate how European ports disclose cybersecurity governance and knowledge management (KM) practices within digital twin (DT) technology environments as part of broader operational resilience and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses qualitative content analysis of publicly available nonfinancial disclosures to investigate two leading European ports, i.e. Rotterdam and Hamburg, that have fully implemented the DT adoption process. Based on 36 documents (sustainability reports, DT roadmaps and innovation strategies) published between 2020 and 2024, the analysis focuses on cybersecurity and KM practices disclosed to stakeholders. By combining automated thematic extraction through Leximancer (Version 5) with manual interpretive coding, the study offers novel insights into how ports publicly frame and disclose DT-related cybersecurity and KM practices, contributing to both theory and practice in maritime digitalization. Findings – Results reveal significant heterogeneity in the scope and depth of cybersecurity and KM disclosures among ports operating within DT frameworks. One port predominantly frames cybersecurity as an operational safeguard, while the other discloses cybersecurity within broader KM-oriented governance practices associated with data-driven decision-making and net-zero emission targets. Originality/value – This study responds to limited research examining the intersection of cybersecurity, KM and DT in port digitalization, particularly through the lens of stakeholder-oriented disclosure. By adopting a comparative case study approach focused on official reporting, it offers novel insights into how ports construct legitimacy and accountability around secure knowledge flows publicly linked to environmental objectives. The results contribute to theory by bridging cybersecurity governance, KM and sustainability disclosure within DT-enabled infrastructures
Cybersecurity, knowledge management and sustainability disclosure in DT-Enabled European ports
Di Vaio, A.
;D'Amore, G.
2026-01-01
Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to investigate how European ports disclose cybersecurity governance and knowledge management (KM) practices within digital twin (DT) technology environments as part of broader operational resilience and net-zero greenhouse gas emissions reduction. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses qualitative content analysis of publicly available nonfinancial disclosures to investigate two leading European ports, i.e. Rotterdam and Hamburg, that have fully implemented the DT adoption process. Based on 36 documents (sustainability reports, DT roadmaps and innovation strategies) published between 2020 and 2024, the analysis focuses on cybersecurity and KM practices disclosed to stakeholders. By combining automated thematic extraction through Leximancer (Version 5) with manual interpretive coding, the study offers novel insights into how ports publicly frame and disclose DT-related cybersecurity and KM practices, contributing to both theory and practice in maritime digitalization. Findings – Results reveal significant heterogeneity in the scope and depth of cybersecurity and KM disclosures among ports operating within DT frameworks. One port predominantly frames cybersecurity as an operational safeguard, while the other discloses cybersecurity within broader KM-oriented governance practices associated with data-driven decision-making and net-zero emission targets. Originality/value – This study responds to limited research examining the intersection of cybersecurity, KM and DT in port digitalization, particularly through the lens of stakeholder-oriented disclosure. By adopting a comparative case study approach focused on official reporting, it offers novel insights into how ports construct legitimacy and accountability around secure knowledge flows publicly linked to environmental objectives. The results contribute to theory by bridging cybersecurity governance, KM and sustainability disclosure within DT-enabled infrastructuresI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
