How much the policy of contractualizazion of the public servant valorised the ministerial employers, the public company clerks and the contractualized public servant? How much after the first crisis of the mix economy model of the sixties this affect the strengthen of the public technocracy that once upon a time was strategic for the development of the country? Is it possible to read those policy as a clue for the disinvestment of the republican government in a part of the public management among hautes fonctions and an administrative class? The objective of this explorative paper is to reconstruct and identify the consequences of the administrative choices on the economic growth of the country, especially focusing on the public company bureaucracy. It is clear that, as already said by De Cecco in the late eighties, the choice of renounce to a technocratic elite in favour of a partitocratic bureaucratic leadership has had consequences in terms of administrative efficiency. Looking at the stocks of ministerial employers of the generic bureaucracy and of the public company clerks we can divide the history in three periods: 1963-1973 with the centre-left government; 1973-1980 with the consequences of the regionalization and 1980-1991, with the end of the first republic. The ministerial employer grow in the period, breaking a relationship both with the population and the gdp. It is a growth that has no reasons to be, and that can be explained just with a political cartelization of the system.

Tecnocrazia pubblica e classi dirigenti nello sviluppo economico italiano (1964-1991)

Alfano V.;Vittoria A.
2019-01-01

Abstract

How much the policy of contractualizazion of the public servant valorised the ministerial employers, the public company clerks and the contractualized public servant? How much after the first crisis of the mix economy model of the sixties this affect the strengthen of the public technocracy that once upon a time was strategic for the development of the country? Is it possible to read those policy as a clue for the disinvestment of the republican government in a part of the public management among hautes fonctions and an administrative class? The objective of this explorative paper is to reconstruct and identify the consequences of the administrative choices on the economic growth of the country, especially focusing on the public company bureaucracy. It is clear that, as already said by De Cecco in the late eighties, the choice of renounce to a technocratic elite in favour of a partitocratic bureaucratic leadership has had consequences in terms of administrative efficiency. Looking at the stocks of ministerial employers of the generic bureaucracy and of the public company clerks we can divide the history in three periods: 1963-1973 with the centre-left government; 1973-1980 with the consequences of the regionalization and 1980-1991, with the end of the first republic. The ministerial employer grow in the period, breaking a relationship both with the population and the gdp. It is a growth that has no reasons to be, and that can be explained just with a political cartelization of the system.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11367/110973
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